Sustaining the Dragon, Dodging the Eagle and Barring
the Bear?
Assessing the Role and Importance of
Central Asia in Chinese National
Strategy
Saim Naveed
ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the role and importance
of Central Asia to China within the context of Chinese grand strategy. It
highlights the importance of the region in terms of providing access to energy
and strategic mineral resources; the military-strategic significance of Central
Asia including its role as a complement to Chinese maritime strategy; and its
importance within Sino-Russian relations, in particular due to the dual
cooperative-competitive context of the Sino-Russian relationship. The impact of
the latter on the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and
Chinese perspectives on its future role is also considered. The paper also
examines the implications for China of Central Asia’s emergence as a critical
geo-economic and geo-strategic nexus between itself, Russia and the West. This
paper concludes with the assessment that Central Asia constitutes both a
strategic priority for China in economic, diplomatic and security terms and a
potential source of challenge to Chinese interests.
Keywords
• Chinese grand strategy • Energy Security • Chinese Maritime Strategy •
Sino-Russian Relations • Central Asia • Shanghai Cooperation
Organization
Introduction
Central Asia constitutes an area of
strategic importance for China. This is due to the region’s position on China’s
western flank; the presence of substantial hydrocarbon and strategic mineral
resources; its role within the wider Sino-Russian relationship; and its
position as a land-bridge that could serve as a vehicle for increasing Chinese
influence in the Middle East and Europe. At present, Central Asia also provides
the primary focus for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)and
thus a testing ground for Chinese multilateral diplomacy. At the grand
strategic level, Chinese interests and imperatives in Central Asia are
reflective of wider fundamental Chinese interests. This is particularly the
case with regard to energy security, the preservation of the ethnic “buffer
zone” regions, for example, Xinjiang, and the prevention of Chinese
“encirclement,” in particular vis-á-vis the United States. In this context,
Xinjiang serves simultaneously as a bridgehead for projecting Chinese influence
into Central Asia and as a bulwark against Uighur and panTurkic nationalism and
separatism,whilst
also constituting the hub for oil and gas imports from Central Asia and hosting
strategic military facilities. This
forms the basis for the objective of securing China’s western flank and
provides the context for Chinese diplomatic, militarystrategic, and to an
extent, economic, engagement with the regional states of Central Asia and
Russia.
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, China moved
rapidly to recognize diplomatically the newly-independent states of Central
Asia and through the 1990s, to engage with the post-Soviet states, including
Russia, to resolve outstanding territorial disputes. This process served as the
basis for the subsequent establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. It also shaped the framework for Sino-Central Asian/Russian
relations on terms favorable to China. That is, China sought to engage Russia
on terms that enabled it to develop its position in Central Asia without
drawing a negative Russian response and reducing the potential for outside, in
particular U.S. or/and Western, involvement in the region. However, the cooperative
element of Sino-Russian relations is tempered by an inherent competitive
dynamic and continuing doubts on both sides vis-á-vis the long-term intentions
of the other. This is exacerbated by the scenarios underpinning military
exercises held by Russia and China respectively such as “Tsentr 2008,” held
jointly with Kazakhstan against a notional invasion of the latter and
culminating with the simulated use of strategic nuclear forces,and
“Northern Sword 2005,” a Chinese exercise against a notional northern adversary
In military-strategic terms, Central Asia is significant to
Chinese strategy for two reasons. First, the states of Central Asia constitute
China’s western flank and share ethnic links to Xinjiang. In this context,
Central Asia constitutes a potential source of secessionist forces vis-á-vis
Xinjiang and via the hosting of a major power, a potential threat to strategic
installations in Xinjiang and China more broadly. Further, due to the
increasing importance of Central Asia in terms of enhancing Chinese energy
security, the security and stability of Central Asia is of increasing
importance in respect to Chinese economic development. Secondly, based on the
aforementioned increasing importance of Central Asia in terms of access to
energy and its position on China’s western flank, the region can serve as a
complement to Chinese maritime strategy. The increasing dependence on sea
lines-of-communication, in particular for energy imports, is stimulating debate
on the requirements for the long-term development of the People’s Liberation
Army Navy, including the degree to which it should be a “blue-water” navy. In
this regard, the development of energy import links with Central Asia aids in
mitigating the total extent of China’s dependence on maritime imports. In
addition, the securing of China’s western flank enables it to maintain its
current eastward focused military posture, prioritize the development of
power-projection capabilities and enhance China’s position in the western
Pacific and South China Sea.
In general terms, the role of Central Asia in Chinese grand
strategy is to serve as a means toward certain objectives; for example,
enhancing energy security and access to strategic raw materials, “containing”
Russia and minimize external influences on the western flank, and enable it to
focus on the Asia-Pacific. It is important as the extent of Chinese success or
failure in Central Asia will significantly contribute toward the shaping of
China’s wider international position, including that of whether it emerges as a
“Great Power”.
The Strategic Central Asian Context
Central Asia is an increasingly significant
focal point for the strategic interests of Russia, China, the West, Iran and
India. This is due in part to the region’s geo-economic value, but also its
geo-strategic position. The region constitutes Russia’s southern flank, China’s
western flank, Iran’s northern flank, and an eastern horizon for the West and
northern horizon for India. The
multi-lateral system of relations between the regional states and
extra-regional powers, plus between the regional states and outside powers
themselves, is complex, interlinked with geopolitical and strategic imperatives
and can be simultaneously cooperative and competitive. This is evident in
Sino-Russian relations. The principal dynamic influencing the strategic Central
Asian context is the set of relationships between the regional states and the
three core extra-regional powers active in the region; Russia, China and the
U.S./West. In addition, there exists the common Sino-Russian interest in
countering increasing Western “encroachment” into Central Asia and assisting
the local regimes in maintaining their positions of power, in particular with
regard to the threat of “color” revolutions. This is reflective of a
further common Sino-Russian interest in maintaining stability in the region and
to an extent, the existing status quo, albeit with reduced Western influence;
this being demonstrated by the SCO’s position against the “three evils” of
extremism, separatism and terrorism. However, despite the commonality of
interests in major components of their respective strategies toward Central
Asia, there also exist competitive and confrontational tendencies. This is due
to the role and importance of Central Asia within both Russian and Chinese
grand strategy. This is further complicated by the importance the West attaches
to Central Asia, especially due to its links to ongoing operations in
Afghanistan. In addition, at present, China does not wish to be drawn into the
deteriorating Russo-Western relationship as a “belligerent”, preferring instead
to maintain balanced relations with both parties.
The contemporary strategic environment in Central Asia has
been compared to the nineteenth century Anglo-Russian “Great Game” this analogy is appropriate due to the range of actors and competing interests
involved in the regional system. This is especially apposite with regard to the
trilateral relationship between Russia, China and the U.S./West and the
increasing reassertion of Russian “primacy” in the former Soviet Union.The
Russian perspective on Central Asia provides both opportunities and challenges
to China. Russia views Central Asia as a component of its exclusive sphere of
influence due to its former Soviet status, and being situated on Russia’s
southern flank, a buffer zone against threats (in particular Islamist extremist
and external powers) to Russian security. Further, the reassertion of Russian
influence over the Central Asian states is perceived to be of critical
importance vis-á-vis Russia’s broader resurgence. In the longer-term, this
may result in tensions between Beijing and Moscow as the latter seeks to ensure
the preeminence of the regional institutional architecture it has created; in
particular the Eurasian Economic Community and Collective Security Treaty
Organization, over other frameworks, that is, the SCO.
The relationship between Beijing and Moscow, vis-à-vis
Central Asia, will be of central importance in determining the degree of
freedomof-maneuver China will have in the international system in the longterm.
Due to the multifaceted regional environment, were there to be a significant
deterioration in relations between Russia and China without a concomitant shift
in the relative balance-of-power between the two, there would be the risk that
China’s interests in Central Asia could become a constraint on its ability to
operate elsewhere. That is, although Central Asia is not the most significant
region of interest for China, it is important enough to demand major attention,
in particular, if the region is either aligned with a hostile power, or
contested between a number of competing powers. In this context, deterioration
in relations between Russia and China, combined with the presence of other
actors in the region – including major peer competitors to China (Japan, South
Korea, India), could reduce China’s strategic room-for-maneuver.
China’s Geo-economic Interests in Central Asia
The development of trade and commercial
links with the states of Central Asia serves both Chinese economic and
strategic interests. This involves the utilization of economic means to serve
strategic ends, in particular with regard to the development of energy and
commoditytrade relationships with key producers and states. This approach
involves China gaining access to energy and strategic commodity resources
whilst securing political and economic influence over the supplier state.
In the Central Asian context, China is establishing
significant economic relationships with key states; that is, states with
substantial energy and/or commodity resources, both as a means of securing
economic objectives and wider geopolitical and strategic objectives. Due to the
legacy of Soviet rule, Russia maintains a substantial capacity for influencing
the states of Central Asia across the economic, political and military
spectrums. However, due to the extensive energy and commodity resources in the
region, the desire of some of the regional states to pursue “multi-vector”
foreign policies, and its own significant economic resources – particularly its
large capital reserves and credit funds,China is creating a
sphere-of-influence within Central Asia that is independent of Russia. This is
being achieved via the development of and an emphasis on, economic and trade linkages.
The pattern of Chinese trade with the states of Central Asia is that of an
importer of raw materials and unfinished products, and an exporter of finished
products;
further, despite China only gaining access to the post-Soviet Central Asian
market in the early 1990s, the balance of trade between China and Central Asia,
and Russia and Central Asia is now comparable.
In addition, as Paramonov discusses, the terms of trade
between China and Central Asia are more beneficial to the former and may reduce
the latter to “raw materials appendages of the Chinese economy”. This establishes the context within which an economic lever becomes a political
instrument. Blank suggests; “China … engenders a mutuallyprofitable but
dependency-inducing long-term relationship”; that is, China gains an
almost quasi-monopsonistic position vis-á-vis the regional states, due to the
latter’s dependency on the Chinese market for exports, imports and finance. For
example, the government of Tajikistan accepted an interest-free loan for
several million dollars from China in 2007, with an accompanying political
cooperation agreement which included a proviso not to recognize Taiwan.
The development of long-term relationships is central to
Chinese policy concerning Central Asia. This is because China’s objectives in
Central Asia are not an end in themselves, but rather, contributing toward
wider national objectives. These objectives include; the attaining of energy
security through diversified source and supply; the addressing of the “Straits
of Malacca dilemma” and the security of Chinese sea lines-of-communication; the
security of China’s western flank and suppressing of separatist tendencies in
the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Of particular importance to Chinese
interests in Central Asia are Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Both states have
substantial hydrocarbon reserves, are located in strategically significant
geographical positions and have some, albeit limited, freedom-of-maneuver
vis-á-vis Russia.
Kazakhstan holds the most importance in terms of the states
of Central Asia. It is the largest of the regional states, occupies a central
position in the region and has substantial oil and gas reserves and deposits of
strategic raw materials, in particular, uranium. With regard to China,
Kazakhstan also constitutes a bridge to the Caspian Sea, a potential buffer
with Russia and a host of Uighur diaspora.[22] China’s principal interests
in Kazakhstan are centered on access to the country’s hydrocarbon and uranium
resources, integrating transportation and transit infrastructure (national and
regional) with Xinjiang and consolidating political influence in Astana. To
this end, China is investing in Kazakh road and rail infrastructure and in the
construction of oil and gas pipelines linking Kazakh hydrocarbon resources to
the Chinese market. This most notably included construction of the
AtyrauAtasu-Alashankou oil pipeline which in 2009 carried six million tons of oil
to China, and
the newly-inaugurated Central Asia Natural Gas Pipeline. This pipeline transports
natural gas from Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China; it will
carry thirty billion cubic meters of Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas per annum.
Further, the Chinese nuclear company, China Guangdong
Nuclear Power Group, has entered into a joint venture with the Kazakh national
nuclear power company Kazatomprom for the construction of nuclear power plants
in China, and for the supply of 24,000 tons of uranium from Kazakhstan by 2020. The
three aforementioned investments are indicative of the importance China
attaches to Kazakhstan especially with regard to Chinese efforts to enhance its
long-term energy security. In addition, although not explicitly stated, such
investments in Kazakhstan reduce the preponderance of Russian influence in
Astana and the region more generally. This is due to Kazakhstan’s position as
the hub for Chinese connecting infrastructure linking Central Asia and Xinjiang,
and in the longer-term, wider maritime-based connections via the Pakistani port
of Gwadar.
The current role of Turkmenistan is principally that of
exporting natural gas to China via the Central Asia Natural Gas Pipeline. This
pipeline however also serves as a potential foundation for conferring upon
Turkmenistan hub status connecting Chinese energy infrastructure in Central
Asia with projected linkages to the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East. A
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan natural gas pipeline has been discussed,but
is contingent on the security situation in Afghanistan. In addition, China has
commenced investments in Afghan energy and mineral resources and
is looking at the development of pipelines linking Afghanistan to China and
potentially Pakistan and the port of Gwadar. Furthermore, Chinese
interest in developing a Gwadar Port Energy Zone including an oil refinery and
other facilities, thus allowing the port to serve as the hub for a network of
Chinese energy interests in the Middle East and Africa and bypassing the
Straits of Malacca. That is, the role of Turkmenistan would be to articulate the Gwadar hub for
maritime-based energy imports with the Central Asian energy infrastructure
connecting it to Kazakhstan and Xinjiang.
In this context, China’s economic objectives in Central
Asia and whether they are successfully attained will have a significant
influence on the development of Chinese military-strategic planning, in
particular with regard to the trajectory of Chinese maritime strategy. This is
especially so concerning the potential role and importance of Gwadar as an
energy hub for Chinese energy imports from the Middle East and Africa, and as a
connector to Central Asian infrastructure.
The Military-Strategic Significance of Central
Asia
The military-strategic and security
environment in Central Asia is of major importance to China and likely to
increase significantly in the mid-to-long term. At present and since the end of
the Cold War, there is no direct military threat to China emanating from
Central Asia. There are, however, security challenges such as those posed by
Islamist elements (including potential spillover from Afghanistan) and
secessionist/separatist elements within the Uighur diaspora. There is also an increasing presence of states in the region which are, or may
in the long-term be, rivals to China and thus constitute a potential challenge
to Chinese interests; in this context, Russia, the United States and India are
of most concern.
The principal focus for enhancing China’s position in
Central Asia has, as discussed above, been economic. This is due to two main
factors. Firstly, China has sought to avoid the expansion of its geopolitical
influence being too explicitly associated with an increasing militarysecurity
presence outside its borders as per the doctrine of “peaceful rise”. Secondly,
and connected with the first point, in Central Asia, due to the Soviet legacy,
Russia is the principal military power in the region, both by virtue of its own
capabilities, the dependence of the Central Asian states on ex-Soviet military
equipment and the continuing institutional influence of Russia, via, for
example, officer training. China has thus tended to focus its efforts on
developing bilateral economic links and deferring to Russia on questions and
matters relating to military and security issues in Central Asia.
The current limited (both in scope and ambition) extent of
China’s security involvement in Central Asia is likely to change as the region
increases in importance to Beijing, and especially if the Gwadar Port Energy
Zone, and associated connections to Central Asia, is developed. This is because
a notional Pakistan-Central Asia-Xinjiang energy corridor would contribute
significantly toward enhancing Chinese energy security and reduce China’s
dependence on maritime traffic transiting the Straits of Malacca. The security
of sea lines-of-communication is a particular concern for Chinese military
strategy; especially due to China’s naval inferiority vis-à-vis the United
States, and increasing maritime competition/rivalry in North-east Asia. This is promoting an increasing interest in developing a sufficient naval
capacity for defending extended sea lines-of-communication. This is
particularly apposite when it is considered that 85 percent of Chinese oil
imports transit the Straits of Malacca, and that China imports half of its
total oil needs, in excess of 7.7 million bpd.
The current central focus for Chinese military strategy and
development is on preparing for a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait and if
necessary, deterring or defeating a potential U.S. intervention. The
Chinese Armed Forces are also positioned for potential contingencies on the
Korean peninsula, the South China Sea and vis-ávis India and the disputed
regions of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. This gives the Chinese military, for
the most part, an eastward orientation. Xinjiang, which is part of the Lanzhou
military region, does host strategic facilities which are of significant importance.
This includes the Lop Nor nuclear-test base, detection and tracking radars
covering Central Asia and China’s northern border,two regiments of H-6
longrange nuclear-capable bomber/stand-off missile launchers (half the total
force), and
potentially, a ground-based anti-satellite laser system situated in the
Tianshan mountains. At
least twelve DF-15D guidedtactical ballistic missile tractor-erector-launchers
have also recently been deployed to Xinjiang as part of a new heavy mechanized
corps.This is indicative of an increasing Chinese intention and capacity for
undertaking a proactive, and potentially interventionist, role in Central Asia.
The deployment of a heavy mechanized corps in Xinjiang, including
guided-tactical ballistic missiles, would provide the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) with a substantial conventional war-fighting capability and means of
projecting power into Central Asia. Martin Andrew has compared the
70,000-strong PLA corps with a Soviet Operational Maneuver Group; this force would also in many respects, establish conventional military
superiority over the Russian forces assigned to Central Asia. The enhancement
of conventional PLA forces in Xinjiang has been accompanied with a concomitant
shift in doctrine for the employment of those forces.40 The
restructured force is intended to operate as a combined arms grouping, and
conduct rapid-paced, offensive operations deep into an adversary’s territory.
Andrew compares this to Operation Desert
Storm and cites a notional Chinese employment of the force to secure
oilfields in Kazakhstan. This operational employment concept is akin to the scenario that the
Russo-Kazakh forces in the aforementioned “Tsentr 2008” exercise sought to
counter.
In the above context, a discernible shift in Chinese
strategy, that is, the projection of military power into a region in order to
secure critical energy supplies is evident. This imperative is also an
important component of China’s evolving maritime strategy. Although landlocked,
Central Asia has a complementary and supporting role in Chinese maritime
strategy. This is based on three principal factors. First, China is dependent
on maritime trade for its economic development; its naval capabilities are
limited and at present focused on Taiwan-centric contingencies and the South
China Sea. China thus does not yet have sufficient naval capacity to also defend its sea
lines-of-communication. Second, the U.S. is a potential adversary and thus
China’s vulnerability to a U.S. Navy campaign against its maritime trade,
especially energy imports, has to be accounted for. In this case, land-based
oil and gas pipelines provide a means of militating against China’s
vulnerability to U.S. naval interdiction. Growing from the globalization of
Chinese economic interests is the realization of the requirement for
globallycapable armed forces, in particular naval forces. That is, developing the
means to protect sea lines-of-communication. 95 percent of China’s seaborne oil
imports are from the Middle East and Africa,45 and these shipments
have to cross the Indian Ocean en route to China; thus, an increasing Chinese
interest in having the means to defend its maritime trade interests
necessitates the ability to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean Region.
This will be even more so, should the Gwadar Port Energy Zone be developed.
China is developing a presence in the Indian Ocean Region via a network of
friendly ports - the “string of pearls”,its naval deployment to the
Gulf of Aden, and has expressed an interest in explicitly establishing a naval
base in the region. This provides the basis for the third factor linking Central Asia and Chinese
maritime strategy, namely, the Sino-Indian rivalry.
In spite of increasing economic and trade links, China and
India remain rivals. This is due to, for example, ongoing border disputes,
China’s support for Pakistan, and general concerns vis-á-vis each others’
respective intentions and actions. The increasing Chinese interest, and
presence in the Indian Ocean is thus of major concern to India and
a stimulus for Indian military, particularly naval, modernization. In this
context, the need for China to reduce the volume of energy imports transiting
the Indian Ocean increases, so to reduce vulnerability to Indian naval
interdiction. This however, places an increased importance upon developing the
Gwadar Port Energy Zone which is also vulnerable to Indian action, thereby
necessitating an increased Chinese presence in the western Indian Ocean region and
support for Pakistan. This would further exacerbate Indian concern. The role of
Central Asia in this nexus of Sino-Indian rivalry, Chinese maritime strategy
and energy security is therefore twofold. Firstly, in order to reduce
vulnerability to Indian naval interdiction, land-based oil and gas pipelines
linking Central Asian hydrocarbons to the Chinese market provide a supplemental
source of supply; Central Asian energy infrastructure is also intended to
provide the link between Middle Eastern and African sources of supply via the
notional Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkmenistan corridor. Second, due to China’s
dependence on the Indian Ocean Region as a critical transit area for its energy
supplies – either by sea or the projected Gwadar terminal, a Chinese military
presence in the region, and thus an Indian response, is necessary. In this
regard, China’s increasing presence in Central Asia provides Beijing with a
northern component of a potential “containment strategy” vis-á-vis Delhi;
whilst military assets deployed in the Lanzhou and Chengdu military regionsprovide a means of projecting power into the Indian sub-continent.
Central Asia, Sino-Russian Relations and the SCO
The Central Asian context of Sino-Russian
relations, as with the broader relationship between the two powers, is complex.
Both China and Russia have mutual interests in the region, in particular with
regard to minimizing Western, especially U.S., influence; securing on favorable
terms, access to hydrocarbon and mineral resources; and ensuring a stable
regional politico-security environment. The latter includes the continuation in
power of “strong” authoritarian regimes and the controlling of political
opposition. This commonality of interests serves as the basis for Sino-Russian cooperation
in Central Asia and is most significantly demonstrated by the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. The SCO, and its antecedent the Shanghai Five
grouping, provides a mechanism within which China can pursue those interests it shares
with Russia and the Central Asian states themselves, that is, principally
separatism, extremism and terrorism, in a context that China has significant
influence over. The SCO also provides a means, in particular via the Regional
Anti-Terrorist Structure, by which China can strengthen security ties with
Central Asia and Russia, thus serving the Chinese objective of enhancing
security in Xinjiang. The
benefit of this approach is that it does not ostensibly rival Russia’s position
in the regional military-security system. Furthermore, the SCO “label” provides
both Russia and China with an increased “respectability” for military
activities they may wish to undertake that are potentially controversial. In
this regard, Blank cites the possibility of a joint SinoRussian military operation
in response to instability in North Korea under the auspices of the SCO; an
expansion of the SCO’s mandate to include maritime security operations, via,
for example, the coordination of the respective Chinese and Russian deployments
in the Gulf of Aden, is reportedly also under consideration.
Due to the aforementioned importance of land-based oil and
gas pipelines as a means of reducing dependence on sea lines-of-
communication, positive Sino-Russian
relations are a pre-requisite for the security of China’s Central Asian
sources-of-supply. As a further step to reinforce its energy security, China
has sought to establish an energy relationship with Russia. This is centered on
the construction of the Eastern Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline which will
include a branch linking Russian supplies to the Chinese market via a terminal
in
Daqing. China will receive 15 million tons
of oil per annum from Russia from 2011-2034. The main pipeline is
intended to proceed to a terminal at Kozmino Bay to enable overseas exports,
albeit, funding has not yet been secured.The ESPO pipeline is
significant in that it ties, at present, Russia to a single customer – China,
and is dependent on the latter’s financing; namely, loans of US$15 billion and
US$10 billion to Rosneft and Transneft respectively. This latter point means
that, after accounting for loan repayments and interest, China will be paying
approximately US$11.40 per barrel for oil from the ESPO pipeline.
This arrangement is indicative of Russian weakness
vis-à-vis China in the economic sphere, and of the complex balance-of-power
between the two. This is important for Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia,
the development of the SCO and, to an extent, the Sino-Indian balance-ofpower.
Although China and Russia share major common interests in Central Asia and more
widely, in particular, the commitment to a multipolar international system, and
have, in many areas a cooperative relationship, there also exists a competitive
dynamic between Beijing and Moscow. This may in the long-term be the basis for
a nascent renewed rivalry. The ESPO pipeline can be viewed in this context of
simultaneous cooperation and competition as it reflects both a Chinese interest
in cooperating with Russia to enhance its energy security, but at the same
time, aiding in a quasi “containment” of Russia. This is due to China being, at
present, the sole customer for the pipeline. Conversely, Russia’s weakness
vis-á-vis China in the case of the ESPO pipeline is mitigated by the latent capability,
for example, provided by its intelligence presence and military links, to
threaten Chinese interests in Central Asia.
The aforementioned importance of Kazakhstan to Chinese
strategy in Central Asia and more widely, is also a potentially significant
vulnerability. Russia maintains substantial influence in Kazakhstan and has
available a number of levers to “influence” Astana and/or undermine Chinese
interests. Potential vulnerabilities in Kazakhstan include the Russian
diaspora, which accounts for 25 percent of the total Kazakh population and
numbers approximately 3.9 million people;and, as of January 1, 2010,
Kazakhstan has entered into a customs union with Russia and Belarus with the
intention of developing a “single economic space” by 2012. These two factors provide
Moscow with the means to substantially influence Astana, as does the continuing
pervasive influence of the Russian military on local armed forces through
training, thinking, for example, senior officers will have been trained in the
Soviet period, and inherited equipment. In addition, the aforementioned
scenario of China undertaking an intervention in Kazakhstan to secure the oil
and gas fields could not be undertaken without the consent of Russia, due to the location of
the oil fields on Kazakhstan’s Caspian coastline and proximity to Russia.Such an intervention would be a de facto invasion of Kazakhstan.
The historical legacy of the Soviet Union, in particularly
with regard to areas such as economic integration, training of cadres for
government, the military and intelligence services, and the use of Russian as a
second language, provides Moscow with a substantial latent influence in the
Central Asian republics. Despite China’s economic advantage, deterioration in
Sino-Russian relations in the mid-term would be more damaging to Chinese
interests in Central Asia. Furthermore, through Russia’s partnership with
India, especially regarding defence cooperation, an increased Chinese activism
in Central Asia that was deemed inimical to Russian interests could be used as
justification for increased cooperation between Moscow and Delhi. Similarly,
post-Soviet multilateral structures such as the Collective Security Treaty
Organization and Eurasian Economic Community provide alternative means for
Moscow to pursue relations with Central Asia outside of the SCO framework. Due
to the potential cost of a downturn in SinoRussian relations and its
implications for Chinese strategy in Central Asia and wider national strategy,
plus the significant commonality of interests between Moscow and Beijing, a
shift from cooperation to pronounced competition is unlikely. The current
dynamic of dual cooperative and competitive relations is thus likely to
continue.
Conclusion
In assessing the role and importance of
Central Asia in Chinese national strategy, there are three questions of
particular importance. First, why does Central Asia matter to China? Second,
how does Central Asia serve Chinese strategic interests? Third, what is Central
Asia’s role in China’s emergence as a “great power”? Central Asia’s position on
China’s western flank effectively means it can serve as either a “back-door” to
China via the province of Xinjiang, or it can serve as a bridge linking China
to South Asia, the Middle East and potentially, Europe, bypassing the
vulnerable maritime routes of Southeast Asia. This enables China to utilize
Central Asia as a supporting pillar of its national strategy, in particular
with respect to efforts to improve energy security and national security
through, for example, militating against separatist and extremist elements in
Xinjiang, and through using Central Asian energy and mineral supplies to reduce
dependency on more vulnerable maritime supplies.
The region also provides an area where Russia and China
through a commonality of interests, have successfully developed a positive
cooperative relationship, albeit with competitive elements, but nonetheless
enhancing Chinese security, and influence in Central Asia. Cooperation with
Russia especially via the SCO has enabled China to raise its military-security
profile in Central Asia and in the longer-term perhaps more broadly, whilst
staying for the most part, within the bounds of its “peaceful rise”. The cooperative
relationship with Russia has further served Chinese interests through the
latter’s “deferral” to continued Russian “preeminence” in Central Asian
military-security matters. In the longer-term, the aforementioned enhancement
of forces in Xinjiang will provide China with the means to proactively defend
its Central Asian interests, forcefully if necessary. The continued Russian
security interest and presence in Central Asia combined with positive relations
with Beijing, has enabled China to concentrate its wider military-strategic
planning and modernization on the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. In
addition, China has prioritized economic relations in its policies toward
Central Asia, partly so as not to antagonize Russia, but also to develop the
confidence of its Central Asian neighbors.
Thus, how does Central Asia contribute to China’s emergence
as a “great power”? Central Asia provides China with an enhanced
room-formaneuver. China’s engagement with the regional states and Russia, has
contributed to improving security on China’s western flank, thereby enabling
Xinjiang to take on the role of “energy hub”. This aids in the development of
Chinese maritime strategy and provides hedges against China’s maritime rivals;
India, Japan and especially the US. Furthermore, through the development of
linkages between Pakistan and Central Asia, China has a nascent foundation for
a potential containment strategy vis-á-vis India. These points contribute
toward China attaining a sufficient position within its regional security
context to enable it to consider developing extra-regional capacities. The
aforementioned possibility of the SCO’s remit being expanded to include a
maritime security dimension is illustrative of one such possibility. At
present, and reflective of the continuing relative strength of the Chinese
economy versus its armed forces, China’s priorities for the SCO will likely
remain in the economic sphere, and so to avoid damaging its “peaceful rise”,
Russian interest in giving the SCO a more robust role will be resisted.
The latter point highlights a potential challenge to
Chinese interests in Central Asia, that is, should the current Sino-Russian
cooperative relationship switch to a competitive dynamic, or in the
longer-term, renewed rivalry. The above-mentioned advantages Central Asia
confers upon Chinese strategic planners are contingent upon the Central Asian
regional system being permissive. If the regional system were to be contested
or hostile, it would significantly complicate China’s wider national strategy
and raise the level of risk to Chinese national security. The benefits of a
stable, permissive Central Asia will thus ensure it remains a major priority
for China in the mid-to-long term.
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